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Ken Pydayya, Peter Hannay & Patryk Szewczyk 
secau -  Security Research Centre 
School of Computer and Security Science 
Edith Cowan University 
Abstract 
The evolution of the internet as a platform for commerce, banking, general information and personal communications 
has resulted in a situation where many individuals who may not have previously required internet access now require 
this connectivity as part of their everyday lives. In addition to this the widespread adoption of mobile broadband has lead 
to an increasing number of individuals having public facing IP addresses with no firewall appliances present. This 
situation has dramatically increased reliance on personal firewalls as the first and often last defence against intruders 
(human and malware alike). The evaluation performed demonstrates the capabilities of current personal firewall 
software to mitigate the threat posed by these intruders. The results show that the majority of personal firewall products 
evaluated are somewhat effective in reducing the risks remote exploitation but leave something to be desired in the area 
of information disclosure. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As the Internet evolves individuals who may not have previously required access to online resources are now 
conveniently acquiring products and services via the Internet (Szewczyk & Furnell, 2009). These same individuals, who 
are acquiring products via the Internet, often do not understand nor have the expertise to implement sufficient security 
onto their workstation. In-turn attackers are exploiting the novice Internet users’ skill set, to acquire personal and 
confidential information from unsuspecting victims. This is evident in that many novice computers users are unable to 
differentiate between legitimate and phishing emails, or firewalls and anti-virus software (Dodge, Carver, & Ferguson, 
2007). 
 
Anti-virus products provide an avenue of defence to the average Internet user in that malicious software may be detected 
and removed in a timely manner. However, had the anti-virus product not detected a newly released malware then the 
victims machine is susceptible to a range of threats. Fortunately new malware tends to steer away from traditional 
malicious activities such as corrupting or deleting data on the workstation. Instead, malware may transform the 
workstation to a zombie in a collection of botnets, to further target and attack vulnerable hosts (Schultz, 2006). Whilst 
there isn’t one solution for diminishing the risk of botnets, there are methods by which to limit or control the amount of 
damage caused. A botnet requires an open Internet connection to connect and communicate with its controller and 
vulnerable hosts. Hence, an updated and well configured firewall may halt the botnets connection, and in-turn prevents 
the vulnerable host from participating and attacking other hosts. 
 
Many consumers attempt to implement a solution onto their workstation to prevent malicious activity from occurring. 
Unfortunately many end-users do not have the skill set to evaluate and determine best possible security tools for their 
workstation. In a recent study many consumers reported utilising a product that was marketed in a clever and convincing 
manner (Szewczyk & Furnell, 2009). To this, many respondents felt that Norton Anti-virus or Norton Firewall, was a 
suitable security product for their computer. The main reason for this judgement was that a trial version of the product 
came pre-installed on their newly purchased workstation and as a result they continued to use it as it appeared never 
required user interaction. Alternatively, respondents also claimed that Norton had advertised its product on both 
television and online. In-turn respondents could name only one company who developed security products. The impact of 
this, is that Norton is not only the most expensive security product on the market, but furthermore it does not rank as 
being one of the most effective security products according to third party evaluations (Best Firewall Software, 2009; 
Personal Firewall Software Review, 2009).  
 
The effectiveness of a personal firewall is subject to its ability to effectively control and block incoming and outgoing 
traffic. In addition software firewalls operate through a learning process in which programs and processes may be 
allowed or denied access to the Internet. If a new process is executed on the selected workstation which requires Internet 
access, the firewall should continually block access until the end-user clearly permits the traffic to flow. Unfortunately 
software firewalls do not clearly and legibly present information on the programs or process which are attempting to 
access the Internet. As a result numerous end-users tend to remove or uninstall the firewall as the questions the firewall 
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presents are often not aimed at an individual with little or no expertise in computer or network security (Frisk & Drocic, 
2004). 
 
The effectiveness of a firewall may rapidly change. As new flaws are detected a firewall which was once considered 
ideal, could quickly become flawed and vulnerable. A vulnerability within a firewall is an error which is prominent in the 
design, development and configuration phase (Kamara, Fahmy, Schultz, Kerschbaum, & Frantzen, 2003). Vendors 
continually release updates for their firewall products, however these updates usually require user interaction which may 
deter the end-user from applying the update. Vulnerabilities within a firewall may lead to the exploitation of further 
vulnerabilities in the operating system and installed software, leaving the end-user susceptible to a range of threats.  
 
In 2006 an unbiased evaluation was conducted on the top ten personal firewalls at the time as rated by numerous 
independent sources (Szewczyk & Valli, 2006). The top ten firewalls were taken from two independent websites and 
tested utilising a variety of penetration testing methods. Furthermore, the firewalls were also examined for their user 
friendliness and their initial configuration. The previous research identified that a test system utilising Comodo Personal 
Firewall resulted in the least number of vulnerabilities or open ports. Its ability to self update was flawless, and there was 
a vast amount of tutorials and instructions provided to the end-user. It also ranked both first and second amongst the 
independent reviews of personal firewalls taken at that time.  
 
Over the duration of the last three years vendors have continued to release updates and revised versions of their products. 
As a result the top ten software firewall has changed. Utilising similar network penetration methods, the firewalls were 
examined for their ability to with stand tests based on and updated network attacks. 
METHOD 
The test systems comprised of two PC clone systems interconnected within a private network. Each system was utilising 
a Microsoft Windows XP Professional operating system with Service Pack 2 installed and all the latest patches and 
updates up to and including April 10th, 2009. Each firewall was independently installed on the test system using didactic 
recommendations made by the vendors through the installation and configuration process. 
 
Table 1 - Personal Firewalls tested 
Product Version 
AVG Anti-Virus Plus Firewall 8.5 
eConceal Firewall Pro 2.0.019.1 
Norman Personal Firewall 7.10.1200
Outpost Firewall 6.5.2358
Sunbelt Personal Firewall 4.6.1861.0 
Sygate Personal Firewall 5.6.2802 
Tiny Firewall 6.5.92 
Webroot Desktop Firewall 5.8.0.25 
ZoneAlarm Pro Firewall 7.0.470.000
Windows Firewall -
 
Each system was tested with one of the listed firewalls with a series of known and published exploits that a competent 
firewall should be able to stop. A brute force of the system was undertaken by Tenable Nessus 3.2.1.1 with all of the 
vulnerability assessment plug-ins enabled. An assessment of open and vulnerable ports was undertaken via Nmap, and a 
Windows based security tested conducted by Manage Engine Security Manager Plus V5.0. 
 
In each situation the software was tested with the default settings enabled, in the instance that a setup selection was 
required, the highest (purportedly most secure) setting was chosen. The justification for this is that it will provide a 
balanced scenario for the evaluation of each firewall, in addition the default selection emulates the behaviour of a large 
proportion of users. 
 
The network scanners were launched against each firewall in sequence. In order to simulate user activity the default 
option was chosen in the case of prompts by the personal firewall software. On the completion of each scan the results 
were recorded for each port. As a baseline the system was scanned with no personal firewall present. These baseline 
results are provided in each result set for comparative purposes. 
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RESULTS 
Prior to the commencement of the testing process the open ports on the system were evaluated in order to determine the 
baseline for testing purposes. In this case the results of the baseline test are shown alongside the results in Figure 1. The 
examination of these results shows clearly that each of the firewall utilities performed differently against the varying scan 
types used by each port scanner. In this case the only firewall software which did not leave any ports accessible was the 
in-built windows firewall. It should be noted however that a port being simply accessible does not necessarily pose a 
security risk or represent vulnerability. The presence of an open port only demonstrates that it is possible to communicate 
with an application listening on that specific port. 
 
 
Figure 1 - Firewall Performance by Open Ports Detected 
 
The results of the complete Nessus vulnerability scan are shown in the figure 2 below. In these scan results the risk 
associated with each vulnerability has been broken down into three categories: low, medium and high. The risk 
evaluations were provided by the Nessus software itself, with low risk representing a non-serious information disclosure, 
such as the system time. Medium risk represents information disclosure that may be serious, such as installed 
applications. Finally high risk signifies the presence of a vulnerability that may allow an attacker to interrupt the 
operation of the system or execute custom commands / code. 
 
 
Figure 2 - Firewall Performance by Vulnerabilities Detected 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
N
um
be
r o
f O
pe
n P
or
ts
 fo
un
d b
y 
Sc
an
ne
r
Nessus
NMAP
SMP
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
N
um
be
r o
f V
ul
ne
ra
bi
lit
ie
s F
ou
nd
Low
Medium
High
Proceedings of the 7th Australian Information Security Management Conference 
 
101| P a g e  
 
As demonstrated in figure 2 there were no products which did not allow any information disclosure, however this in itself 
may not pose a significant security threat. The results are fairly positive for the majority of personal firewalls protecting 
against medium/high classed risks. The personal firewalls which did not shield against risks classified as medium or high 
are: Windows Firewall, Tiny Firewall and Webroot Desktop Firewall. It is also worth noting that Tiny Firewall and 
Webroot Desktop Firewall allowed for information disclosure that was not possible with no firewall present. 
CONCLUSION 
The importance of robust personal firewall software is rapidly becoming more critical as the adoption of mobile 
broadband and commercial wireless services increase. The increase in uptake of these services can be likened to the past 
in which dialup modems we’re common, as in both of these scenarios internet access is often direct, with the computer 
being assigned a publicly accessible IP address. This situation results in the direct exposure of users to network aware 
malware on the internet, without the need to compromise NAT filtering which has previously protected home users to a 
limited extent. 
 
The research has successfully investigated the robustness of a number of personal firewall products. The results of this 
research demonstrate that the majority of personal firewall products tested provides a significant level of protection when 
tested in the defined manner. It is of interest however that two of the personal firewall products tested allowed for 
additional information disclosure that was not present with no firewall installed. The nature of this information disclosure 
warrants further research. 
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APPENDIX A 
Port scan results for each scanner & personal firewall. 
 
NESSUS (Inbuilt Port Scanner, Default Settings) 
ICMP  UDP  TCP 
Product  N/A  123  137  138  445  500  1900  4500 21  135  139  445 
None  X  X  X     X              X  X  X 
Windows Firewall                                     
AVG     X                               
eConceal                                     
Norman  X  X                               
Outpost                                     
Sunbelt                                     
Sygate                                     
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Tiny  X  X  X                    X  X  X 
Webroot  X  X                          X  X 
ZoneAlarm                                     
 
NMAP (Connect, SYN & UDP) 
ICMP  UDP  TCP 
Product  N/A  123  137  138  445  500  1900  4500 21  135  139  445 
None  X  X  X     X              X  X  X 
Windows Firewall                                     
AVG                          X          
eConceal  X                       X          
Norman  X                       X          
Outpost  X                       X     X  X 
Sunbelt  X                       X          
Sygate  X                       X          
Tiny  X                       X  X  X  X 
Webroot  X                       X  X  X  X 
ZoneAlarm                          X          
 
SMP 
ICMP  UDP  TCP 
Product  N/A  123  137  138  445  500  1900  4500 21  135  139  445 
None     X  X  X  X  X  X  X     X  X  X 
Windows Firewall                                     
AVG                                     
eConceal                                     
Norman                                     
Outpost                                X  X 
Sunbelt                                     
Sygate                                     
Tiny     X  X  X  X  X  X  X     X  X  X 
Webroot                             X  X  X 
ZoneAlarm                                     
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